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Abstract 
In the current conjuncture, populism describes the disruption of the definition 
of, and connection between, democracy, law and rights. It represents the challenge to 
both the existing forms of political representation of the people and to the wider ju-
ridico-political framework or institutions of democracy. In contrast to predominantly 
political analyses of this populist phenomenon, which have rendered the relationship 
of populism to positive law peripheral, the focus will upon a juridico-political anal-
ysis of populism. The analysis will concentrate upon the central aspects of the rela-
tionship between populism and positive law (Law and Morality; Law and Rights and 
Law and Violence).
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Resumen 
En la coyuntura actual, el populismo describe la interrupción de la definición y la 
conexión entre democracia, ley y derechos. Representa el desafío tanto para las formas 
existentes de representación política del pueblo como para el marco jurídico-político 
más amplio o las instituciones de la democracia. En contraste con los análisis predo-
minantemente políticos de este fenómeno populista, que han hecho que la relación del 
populismo con el derecho positivo sea periférica, la atención se centrará en un análisis 
jurídico-político del populismo. El análisis se concentrará en los aspectos centrales de 
la relación entre populismo y ley positiva (Ley y Moralidad; Ley y Derechos y Ley y 
Violencia).
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Introduction
The following analysis, which places the notion of the juridico-political at the centre 
of a reflection upon populism, arises from a position of critical distance from central 
elements of the predominant conceptualization of populism. The adoption of this crit-
ical distance is, however, related to the forms of contemporary populism in Europe 
which are considered to disrupt or challenge the interconnection between democracy, 
law and rights in an exclusively negative sense: a transformation or modification which 
constrains or undermines this interconnection.1 The definition of the limits of the do-
main of this critical, juridico-political reflection, therefore, relinquishes the intention 
to engage in an analysis of forms of populism marked by a predominantly positive or 
inclusionary sense which seek to broaden the existing interconnection between democ-
racy, law and rights. The analysis, therefore, leaves both the tradition of Latin American 
populism and the comparatively novel instances or pre-figurations of a left populism in 
Western Europe unexamined. The absence of analysis of the predominantly positive or 
inclusionary character of Latin American populism derives from its geographical and 
historical distinctiveness which requires a separate analysis attentive to its particular 
complexities.2 The more recent, tentative emergence of a phenomenon of left popu-
lism in Western Europe remains outside the focus of analysis as it is unclear whether it 
is, as yet, a sufficiently well-delineated phenomenon to enable sustained interrogation 
of both its particular and general features.3 The analysis is initiated through a critical 
overview of certain of the central elements of the predominant approach to the con-
ceptualization of contemporary populism. From this critical overview, the pertinence 
of the juridico-political framework for reflection will be indicated, and the analysis will 
1. The analysis leaves aside the phenomenon of populism in the United States of America as it is unclear whether the 
recent election of Donald Trump, as President of the United States of America, represents a general transformation of the 
historical origin and character of populism in the United States of America or, alternatively, is confined to an alteration of 
the character of the Republican Party.
2. For recent analyses of Latin American populism, see, for example, Barr (2017), Munck (2018), Peruzzotti (2017), Szna-
jder, Roniger & Forment (2012), de la Torre and Arnson (2013). For recent considerations of the emergence of the phe-
nomenon of left populism in Western Europe, see, for example, Hamburger (2018); Kioupkiolis & Seoane Pérez (2018), 
Mouffe (2018), Olsen (2018); Solar & Rendueles (2018), De Giorgi & Russo (2018). 
3. This is something other than the “series of aporias” that Krastev formulates to encapsulate a politics of global protest: 
“The protesting citizen wants change but he rejects any form of political representation. He longs for political community, 
but he refuses to be led by others. He is ready to take the risk of being beaten or even killed by the police, but he is afraid to 
take the risk of trusting any party or politician. He is dreaming of democracy, but he has lost faith in elections” (Krastev, 
2014, p.32). Rather, it requires a much more fundamental interrogation of the adequacy of, or necessity for, a notion of a 
left or a progressive populism. 
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then proceed to examine the relationship between the exclusionary form of populism 
and positive law.
Critical Overview of Predominant Analysis of Contemporary 
Populism
The critical overview, in confining its parameters to the contemporary form of pop-
ulism which is essentially exclusionary, concentrates upon the character of the predom-
inant analysis of a populism which disrupts or challenges the interconnection between 
democracy, law and rights. From this negative definition, the predominant approach to 
the conceptualization of contemporary populism is of a political project centred upon 
the reconfiguration of the character of democratic political representation (for exam-
ple, Caramani, 2017; Heinisch & Mazzoleni, 2016; Mudde, 2014). 
The further analysis of the political project of contemporary exclusionary populism 
describes both the emergence of new forms or expressions of political representation of 
the people and a wider challenge to the existing juridico-political framework or insti-
tutions of democracy. In relation to this placing into question and wider challenge, the 
specific position of positive law and forms of legal argumentation have been a relatively 
peripheral consideration.
In particular, the predominant analysis of the current phenomenon of exclusion-
ary populism, has led to a type of weakening of the connection between the two terms 
of the juridico-political combined with an increased primacy accorded to the politi-
cal. This is evident in the concentration upon the question of the formation or origin 
of a populist politics which is determined by the categories of political philosophy/
theory, psychoanalysis and psychology (for example, Brömmel, König & Sicking, 
2017; Bizeul & Rohgalf, 2018; Hoffman, 2018; Marchlewska et. al., 2018; Reynié, 2013; 
Taguieff, 2007; Taguieff, 2015) which is then accompanied by the concomitant trans-
formation of the juridical into the formation and expression of a populist (collective) 
will or plurality of wills.
Hence, from a theoretical perspective, there is a tendency for this return to be one 
which results in a reflection upon the aporias of the will of popular sovereignty (in 
which the will is never fully instantiated in its products or results); and upon the cre-
ative or destructive position of this will with regard to the existing framework or insti-
tutions of democracy. The reorientation of the focus upon the juridico-political, in the 
SOFT-Taco #10.indd   82 17/01/19   22:49
83
following analysis, involves something other than the mere restoration of the connec-
tion between the two terms as either the reassertion of the primacy of the juridical and/
or the reassertion of a liberal legalism or constitutionalism.4
The Juridico-Political Analysis of Contemporary Populism and 
Positive Law 
The notion of the juridico-political, which guides the reflection upon contemporary 
exclusionary populism, restores a particular analytic conjunction between law and pol-
itics. The conjunction centres upon the relationship between contemporary exclusion-
ary populism and positive law and, in this manner, identifies the distinctive character 
of disruptive effect of contemporary exclusionary populism upon the interconnection 
between democracy, law and rights.
Law and Morality
In relation to the debate within Anglo-American legal positivism (for example, 
Himma, 2004; Kramer, 1999; Marmor, 2004; Raz, 1994; Waluchow, 1994), contempo-
rary exclusionary populism situates itself outside the question of an inclusive or exclu-
sive relationship between law and morality. It is unconcerned with the determination 
of the degree of autonomy or independence of law and morality because this autonomy 
or independence is considered to be an aspect of the obstruction of the expression of 
the popular will.
The content of this popular will, divisible into a set of beliefs or conceptions of its 
position in regard to the existing interconnection between democracy, law and rights, 
becomes the basis for a form of ‘re-embedding’ of morality into law. The term ‘re-em-
bedding’ is used here, in place of a theory of natural law, in order to indicate a broad 
foundation which potentially encompasses, but is not confined to, the theological or a 
notion of absolute justice.5 
4. Thus, the analysis differs from the approaches to contemporary exclusionary populism of Müller (2017) and Mounk 
(2018). 
5. Thus, the analysis differs from that of Mouffe (2018) who considers that, in demarcating the domain of analysis of 
populism, “although the question of populism is, no doubt, also relevant in Eastern Europe, those countries necessitate a 
special analysis. They are marked by their specific history under communism and their political culture presents different 
features” (pp. 9-10). 
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The broad foundation also acknowledges that contemporary populism is not nec-
essarily synonymous with nor confined to the simple reassertion of conventional forms 
of morality (‘family values’ etc.).6 It appears to have a marked orientation towards the 
identification of sources or figures representing external hindrances and obstacles rath-
er than to merely ensuring the solidity of the internal morality of the ‘we’ of the popular 
will. The broad foundation is, therefore, considered to flow predominantly from the 
perception of the character of the limits or obstructions to the full expression of this 
popular will. The limits or obstructions are viewed as multifarious and are held to be 
equally present within the interlinked elements of society, law and state. 
In the absence of a simple reiteration of forms of conventional morality, the marked 
focus upon limits and obstructions generates the reassertion of a popular sovereignty 
whose origin is held to arise beyond existing state institutions. The character of these 
limits and obstructions, although commonly held to inhere in the present, has a certain 
fluidity depending upon the degree to which the reassertion of this popular sovereignty 
involves a wider process of historical reinterpretation.7 Within this broad relationship 
between morality and law, the disruptive and negative effect results from a process of 
‘re-embedding’ of morality into law which has the capacity to be centred upon both 
upon the limits and obstructions in the present and to extend or combine this focus 
with the reinterpretation of the past.8 
The differing configurations of the ‘re-embedding’ of morality into law in the var-
ious forms of contemporary exclusionary populism are accompanied by a common 
functional conception of law. The relationship between morality and law is one in 
which the process of ‘re-embedding’ morality accords law the essentially instrumental 
6. Hence, the focus, in Poland, upon women’s reproductive rights (on the question of women’s reproductive rights in 
Poland, see Mishtal (2015, 2018), is encompassed within this broadly defined relationship between law and morality, as 
one particular configuration of this relationship. For, since the European “migration crisis” of 2015, in this form of exclu-
sionary populism, the regulation of Polish women’s reproductive rights has been combined with the presentation of an 
“invasion” of Muslim “refugees” who, beyond their supposed propensity for terrorism, have a “natural” propensity to have 
more children. Thus, creating, on the basis of this presupposition, the eventual possibility for an Islamic majority (see, 
Goździak & Márton, 2018).
7. The configuration of the relationship between law and morality tends to involve a more pronounced process of historical 
reinterpretation in Poland, centred upon World War II, with the Holocaust Law and the Museum of the Second World War 
in Gdańsk (see, Koncewicz, 2017; Kridle, 2018; Clark & Duber, 2018). In Hungary, the emphasis is upon a more general 
reconfiguration of the meaning of central historical experiences of the Hungarian people of the twentieth century (see, 
Benazzo, 2017; Seewann, 2018). 
8. It is in this sense, perhaps, that it is possible to differentiate, within this analysis, the contemporary forms of exclusionary 
populism in Western Europe from those in Eastern Europe. The term differentiation is utilized here in order to suggest a 
difference within a more general identity, as the contemporary forms of exclusionary populism in Western Europe also 
include an understanding of their relationship to the past. 
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function of overturning these limits and obstructions. The instrumentalization of law 
is accompanied by the designation of the comparative importance of specific domains 
of law which will, in turn, be reflected in the intensity and extent of legal intervention 
within them.
The emphasis upon both internal and external limits and obstructions leads to the 
heightened concentration, within the particular national legal system, upon the legal 
fields of constitutional/administrative law, criminal law, immigration law and, to a less-
er degree, family law. The areas of civil law and criminal law which relate to the econ-
omy – composed of both the private and public sector – remain relatively undisturbed 
except insofar as they relate to the intersection between the labour market and state 
provision for those outside the labour market.9 The legal fields which are selected as the 
primary sites are subject to a radical form of legal intervention which involves signifi-
cant substantive and procedural transformation. 
In the field of constitutional/administrative law, the legal intervention is marked 
by the hollowing out of the independence of state institutions, with a particular focus 
upon the provisions of the constitution and the composition and powers of the con-
stitutional court. The legal intervention seeks to reorder the hierarchy of the elements 
of the state within the juridical framework of the constitution to ensure the primacy of 
the executive and legislative branches and to reduce the effective capacity of the judicial 
branch – the constitutional court – to engage in constitutional review of legislation and 
its application by other state institutions and personnel.10 
The comparative diminution of the judicial branch of the state is an aspect of the 
broader phenomenon, within contemporary exclusionary populism, of the assertion 
of the primacy of state sovereignty in relation to the obligations imposed by interna-
tional legal instruments. The limitation or denial of obligations of international law 
are centred upon those relating to regular and irregular migrants and are the corollary 
of the assertion of the primacy of the state’s determination of the entry, residence 
and expulsion of non-nationals.11 This central focus of contemporary exclusionary 
9. It is here that the question of the relationship between contemporary exclusionary populism and the preceding neo-lib-
eralism of the existing political parties arises most directly. Although contemporary exclusionary populism in Hungary 
indicates a strong degree of continuity (Szikra, 2014; Szikra, 2018), this is not manifest to the same degree in other contem-
porary exclusionary populisms (Afonso & Rennwald, 2018; Otjes et al., 2018).
10. This field of law is a primary focus of the contemporary exclusionary populism in Poland and Hungary (Kelemen, 2017; 
Koncewicz, 2018; Sadurski, 2018). 
11. The limitation and/or denial potentially involves the European Convention of Human Rights, European Union Law, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the UN Convention Against Torture, the Law of the Sea and norms 
which have attained the status of customary international law. There will also be a differentiation between the forms of 
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populism overlaps with a broader challenge to the European Union – the transna-
tional framework of contemporary European liberal and social democracy – if the 
assertion of the primacy of state sovereignty is combined with a project of juridi-
co-political transformation which limits or denies the Member State’s positive and 
negative obligations arising from Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union.12 
Law and Rights
The fields of law which are the focus of the legal intervention of contemporary ex-
clusionary populism, animated by the ‘re-embedding’ of morality into law, are subject 
to a transformation which affects the existing structure and foundation of legal rights. 
The modification of legal rights, resulting from this transformation, is uninterested in 
responding to the question ‘what is a right?’, and, therefore, substitutes the presuppo-
sition of an already existing ‘we’ for any further questioning of the foundation of legal 
rights. Thus, contemporary exclusionary populism conceives the structure and founda-
tion of rights in a manner which cannot be thematised by either an interest theory or 
a will theory of rights derived from contemporary Anglo-American legal positivism.13 
For, the consideration of rights, and their expression as norms of positive law within a 
domestic legal system, is unconcerned with the determination of the function of a right 
or the character of the individual legal subject upon which right is conferred. 
The focus of contemporary exclusionary populism is solely upon who is to be at-
tributed with rights and, in this process of attribution, the determination of the com-
parative strength of rights and their correlative obligations. The position is more 
complex than a mere reduction or destruction of the notion of rights. Rather, it is the 
modification of a spectrum or field of legal statuses, defined by the existing framework 
of positive law, within which it seeks to translate the values/morals of this ‘we’. This 
focus opens the further question of the extent to which the process of modification 
contemporary exclusionary populism derived from the effect of this limitation and/or denial on the status of already estab-
lished immigrant communities together with historically older minority communities. 
12. Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union, states that “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human 
dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belong-
ing to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, 
tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail”. This is considered, by the European Union, 
to be the situation with regard to the forms of contemporary exclusionary populism in Poland (Wyrzykowski, 2018) and 
Hungary (Halmai, 2018).
13. For the contrasting positions of Anglo-American discussion, see Kramer, Simmonds & Steiner (2000), Kramer & Stein-
er (2007), Van Duffel (2012), Kramer (2013), Steiner (2013).
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involves the creation and/or maintenance of legal statuses which do not attain the level 
of complete rights and obligations.
The process of modification of the spectrum of existing legal statuses will potentially 
result in both the introduction of new or additional rights and the modification/reduc-
tion/abolition of existing rights. In this process of transformation, the people is con-
ferred with its expression in legal rights and the existing legal statuses of those who are 
considered to oppose, obstruct or undermine this expression in rights of the people will 
be modified, reduced or abolished. The alteration of existing legal statuses establishes a 
firm juridical distinction between those are within the people and those are outside the 
people. The firmness of the distinction is established by both the inferior legal status of 
those defined as outside the people – exemplified by the legal status and rights accorded 
to regular and irregular migrants – and the severing of the notion of a duty or obliga-
tion to those deemed outside the people. The interruption of the relationship between 
rights and duties is particularly marked in relation to migrants where the notion of a 
duty or obligation, in relation to individual or civil society assistance, has been severed 
through criminalization.14 
This process immediately raises the question of the conflict of rights at two levels or 
stages. The first concerns the conflict which is associated with the process of transfor-
mation itself: the insistence upon the continued validity/legitimacy of the existing legal 
statuses and the recourse to institutional (e.g., judicial review/constitutional court) and 
non-institutional forms of challenge (demonstrations, civil disobedience, etc.), which 
themselves involve further questions of the scope of legal rights and freedoms. The 
boundary between the people and those outside the people established by the process 
of legal transformation remains essentially unstable as it is subject to potential contesta-
tion from those whose legal status is altered and to perpetual revision, by contemporary 
exclusionary populism, of the definition of the people. 
The second concerns the extent of the recognition or acknowledgement, by contem-
porary exclusionary populism, of the continued inherence of conflict within the process 
of the translation of the people – the ‘we’ – into legal rights. For, the passage from the 
people to legal rights involves the differentiation and individualization of the morality 
14. The character of criminalization differs with the criminalization in Denmark, under the Aliens Act, specified as assis-
tance in the form of transportation of undocumented migrants which is defined as the criminal offence of human traffick-
ing. In contrast, the 2018 legislation and constitutional amendment in Hungary creates a criminal offence of “promoting 
and supporting illegal immigration” which encompasses the criminalization of assistance by lawyers and individuals to 
asylum seekers in the Hungarian border zone together with the wider activities of NGOs of monitoring of the Hungarian 
border, producing or disseminating information and network building. 
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which contemporary exclusionary populism re-embeds in law. In this differentiation 
and individualization, the pre-existing unity of the people – the ‘we’ – is fragmented 
into a set of separable values which, as legal rights, individuates the ‘we’ into a plurality 
of distinct legal right holders. The individuation creates a set of formally equal rights 
which contain the potential for a conflict of rights with the assertion of one of these 
rights against another. Thus, contemporary exclusionary populism, in the passage from 
the ‘we’ to legal rights, reinforces the instability of the ‘we’ and is required to consider 
the institutional mechanisms which it will utilize in order to resolve them.15 
Law and Violence
The potential for the emergence of a conflict of rights within the process of legal 
transformation of contemporary exclusionary populism leads to the further question 
of the relationship between law and violence. This question relates both to the manner 
of the modification, by this form of populism, of the existing spectrum of legal statuses 
and institutions and to the populism’s wider conception of the connection between 
norm and enforcement.
In regard to the existing spectrum of legal statuses, the relationship between law and 
violence arises from the radicalism of project of modification. The radicalism becomes 
the symbolic violence of the legislative formulation of the character of the modifica-
tion which is to be undertaken.16 This relates both to the type of legislation – new law 
or amendment of existing law – which is utilized to effect the modification and to the 
content of the legal norms, created by the legislation, which alter the existing spectrum 
of legal statuses. The degree of violence which arises is further qualified or reinforced 
depending upon the extent to which the juridical branch of the state retains the capacity 
to review the legislative provisions. 
The symbolic violence of the preparatory stages of the drafting and introduction of 
the legislative modification is transformed, with the passage of the legislation, into a vio-
lence inscribed in the legal statuses which result from this modification. The inscription 
15. This potential conflict will be more immediately evident in situations where the political parties of contemporary ex-
clusionary populism form a coalition, or the coalition is between a political party of contemporary exclusionary populism 
and a political party from the pre-existing political system. 
16. It should also be emphasized that the radicalism of the project of legislative modification will be shaped by the presence 
of preparatory violence in the discourse of adopted by contemporary exclusionary populism. The attribution a of causal 
connection between the violence of this discourse and the incitement to violence – an immediate and, in many cases, lethal 
violence without legislation – is, however, always denied by a contemporary populism which seeks to remain within the 
framework of the existing political system (see, Leezenberg, 2015). 
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of the violence is produced by the creation and reproduction of a legal status, within the 
spectrum of legal statuses, which entails the permanent precariousness or uncertainty 
of the individuals who are ascribed this status. The precariousness or uncertainty relates 
predominantly to the legal statuses ascribed to those individuals or groups considered 
by contemporary exclusionary populism to be outside the ‘we’. Within those held to ex-
ist outside the ‘we’, the primary focus for the ascription of these perpetually precarious 
or uncertain legal statuses are irregular and regular migrants seeking entry to, or present 
on the territory of, the state whose juridico-political framework is directed by contem-
porary exclusionary populism. The precarity and uncertainty relates to the possibility 
of entry and continued residence together with the type of socio-economic existence 
that migrants experience within the territory of the particular state. 
The violence embedded in the definition of these legal statuses is compounded by 
the enforcement of these statuses. The essential precarity and uncertainty of the legal 
status is the corollary of the range of coercive actions of state institutions accompanied 
by minimal procedural protection utilized to maintain individuals within the parame-
ters of a particular legal status. The state’s recourse to arrest, detention and deportation 
is subject to minimal regulation by either judicial or administrative proceedings. 
The relationship between law and violence in contemporary exclusionary populism 
extends beyond that involved in the modification of the spectrum of legal statuses to 
encompass the wider question of the existing institutions of liberal democracy and the 
welfare state. The radicalism of the modification of the spectrum of legal statuses is an 
aspect of the transformation of the existing juridico-political framework and indicates 
the disruptive force of the particular form of contemporary exclusionary populism. The 
disruption and reconfiguration of the existing institutional system is accompanied by 
the weakening of the conventional conceptualization of the relationship between law 
and violence: the return to the personalization of forms of authority and the accompa-
nying personification of juridico-political concepts.17 
The increasing emphasis of contemporary exclusionary populism upon personifica-
tion remains a weakening, rather than a supplanting of the existing relationship between 
law and violence, as it is simultaneously bound to the continued affirmation of the ‘we’ 
of popular sovereignty. The forms of contemporary exclusionary populism involve the 
continuous passage between forms of personal authority and popular sovereignty in the 
17. The ascendancy of personification will also be reinforced to the extent that the practice of personal patronage becomes 
a central mechanism in the institutional practices of a form of contemporary exclusionary populism. 
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weakening of the existing juridico-political framework or institutions of democracy.18 
The predominant effect of weakening is itself the reflection of the dependence upon 
the different internal dynamics of the passage between personal authority and popular 
sovereignty. The difference is determined by the relative position of the leader, party and 
movement within a form of contemporary exclusionary populism.19 
The return to the personalization of forms of authority and the accompanying 
personification of juridico-political concepts is the manner in which contemporary 
exclusionary populism reformulates the relationship between law and violence. It is 
a reformulation which, in place of all conceptualizations of the regulation and dim-
inution of violence by law, assumes their essential reversibility as the counterpart of 
the disruption of the existing relationship between democracy, law and rights.20 The 
presumption of reversibility is the expression of the inherent instability of the juridi-
co-political framework of contemporary exclusionary populism which is subject to the 
perpetual upheaval of reproducing popular sovereignty within positive law.
Conclusion
The profound disruption, by contemporary exclusionary populism, of the juridi-
co-political framework, revealed through its effect upon positive law, requires that, if 
one is to proceed from the critical analysis proceed to a critical response, this is to be 
undertaken through a reconceptualization of the juridico-political. The combination of 
reflection and reformulation involved in this reconceptualization detaches the critical 
response from both the delineation of a progressive, inclusionary populism and the 
purely defensive posture of the revalorization of the institutions of liberal constitution-
alism and the welfare state.
The reflection and reformulation concentrate upon the conceptualization of a life-
in-common, beyond the perpetual passage between forms of personal authority and 
popular sovereignty of contemporary exclusionary populism, through the juridico-po-
litical notions of solidarity and the common. The foundation of the reflection and re-
18. See, for example, the analysis of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) in Ajanovic, Mayer and Sauer (2018). 
19. For Minkenberg (2018) the different internal dynamics indicate a distinction between the dominance of parties over 
movements in Western European forms of contemporary exclusionary populism and the Eastern European forms marked 
by mutual interaction between parties and movements.
20. Thus, the conception of the relationship between law and violence of contemporary exclusionary populism never 
attains the level of a self-reflection of law on its own violence as thematised by Menke (2018).
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formulation in the concept of a life-in-common displaces the construction of the ‘we’ 
of contemporary exclusionary populism resulting from the ‘re-embedding’ of morality 
into law. The further internal differentiation and distinction within this concept of a 
life-in-common are elaborated through the connection to the notions of solidarity and 
the common. 
In this elaboration, the domains of private law – property and the economy – and 
public law – the state and the constitution – together with their conceptual traditions 
are rethought in order to provide for the expression of the notions of solidarity and the 
common in categories of law.21 The distinctive universalism of these notions encom-
passes the distinction between national and international law as an integral part of the 
process of rethinking and rearticulation of domains and categories of law. 
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